Adversarial Examples

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Today's Agenda

Intriguing properties of neural networks

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Christian Szegedy
Google Inc.

Wojciech Zaremba
New York University

Ilya Sutskever
Google Inc.

Joan Bruna
New York University

Dumitru Erhan
Google Inc.

Ian Goodfellow
University of Montreal

Rob Fergus
New York University
Facebook Inc.

Abstract

- Deep neural networks are powerful learning models that achieve excellent performance on visual and speech recognition problems.
- It can be difficult to interpret and can have counter-intuitive properties.

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- The paper discusses two counter-intuitive properties of deep neural networks.
  1. There is no distinction between individual high level units and random linear combinations of high level units.
     - It suggests that **it is the space**, rather than the individual units, that **contains the semantic information** in the high layers of neural networks.

Abstract

- Deep neural networks are powerful learning models that achieve excellent performance on visual and speech recognition problems.
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- The paper discusses two counter-intuitive properties of deep neural networks.
  1. There is no distinction between individual high level units and random linear combinations of high level units.
     - It suggests that **it is the space**, rather than the individual units, that **contains the semantic information** in the high layers of neural networks.
  2. The authors found that applying an **imperceptible non-random perturbation** to a test image, it is possible to arbitrarily **change the network's prediction**.
     - They term the so perturbed examples **Adversarial Examples**.
     - They found that adversarial examples are relatively robust, and are **shared by neural networks** with varied number of layers, activations or trained on different subsets of the training data.

Notation

- Denote by $x \in R^m$ an input image, and $\phi(x)$ activation values of some layer, where m is the input dimension.

Units of $\phi(x)$

- Traditional computer vision systems rely on feature extraction: often a single feature is easily interpretable, e.g. a histogram of colors.
- Some works interpret an activation of a hidden unit as a meaningful feature. They look for input images which maximize the activation value of this single feature.
- The aforementioned technique can be formally stated as visual inspection of images x?, which satisfy (or are close to maximum attainable value):

$$x' = \underset{x \in \mathcal{I}}{argmax} \langle \phi(x), e_i \rangle \tag{1}$$

where $\mathcal{I}$ is a hold-out set of images from the data distribution that the network was not trained on and e_i is the natural basis vector assocated with the i-th hidden unit.

Units of $\phi(x)$

(a) Unit sensitive to lower round stroke.

(b) Unit sensitive to upper round stroke, or lower straight stroke.

(c) Unit senstive to left, upper round stroke.

(d) Unit senstive to diagonal straight stroke.

Units of $\phi(x)$

- The experiments show that any random direction $v \in R^n$ gives rise to similarly interpretable semantic properties.
- More formally, They find that images x' are semantically related to each other, for many x' such that

$$x' = \underset{x \in \mathcal{I}}{argmax} \ \langle \phi(x), v \rangle \tag{2}$$

- This suggests that the natural basis is not better than a random basis for inspecting the properties of $\phi(x)$.
- This puts into question the notion that neural networks disentangle variation factors across coordinates.

Units of $\phi(x)$

(a) Direction sensitive to upper straight stroke, or lower round stroke.

(b) Direction sensitive to lower left loop.

(c) Direction senstive to round top stroke.

(d) Direction sensitive to right, upper round stroke.

Network Level Inspection

- So far, unit-level inspection methods had relatively little utility beyond confirming certain intuitions regarding the complexity of the representations learned by a deep neural network
- Network level inspection methods can be useful in the context of explaining classification decisions made by a model
    - For instance, identify the parts of the input which led to a correct classification of a given visual input instance
- Such global analyses are useful in that they can make us understand better the input-to-output mapping represented by the trained network.

How to Explain Individual Classification Decisions

A probability function $P : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow [0, 1]$ of a classification model learned from examples $\{(x_1, y_1), ..., (x_n, y_n)\} \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \{-1, +1\}$ (binary classification) the explanation vector for a classified test point x_0 is the local gradient of p at x_0:

$$\eta_p(x_0) = \nabla_{x_0} P(x_0)$$

- By this definition the explanation η is again a d-dimensional vector just like the test point x_0 is.
- The sign of each of its individual entries indicates whether the prediction would increase or decrease when the corresponding feature of x_0 is increased locally and each entry's absolute value give the amount of influence in the change in prediction.
- As a vector η gives the direction of the steepest ascent from the test point to higher probabilities for the positive class.

How to Explain Individual Classification Decisions



(a) Object (b) Model

(c) Local explanation vectors (d) Direction of explanation vectors

How to Explain Individual Classification Decisions

Figure 5: USPS digits (test set bottom part): 'twos' (left) and 'eights' (right) with correct classification. For each digit from left to right: (i) explanation vector (with black being negative, white being positive), (ii) the original digit, (iii-end) artificial digits along the explanation vector towards the other class.

Adversarial Examples



(a)



(b)

Figure 5: Adversarial examples generated for AlexNet [9].(Left) is a correctly predicted sample, (center) difference between correct image, and image predicted incorrectly magnified by 10x (values shifted by 128 and clamped), (right) adversarial example. All images in the right column are predicted to be an *"ostrich, Struthio camelus"*. Average distortion based on 64 examples is 0.006508. Plase refer to `http://goo.gl/huaGPb` for full resolution images. The examples are strictly randomly chosen. There is not any postselection involved.

Smoothness Prior (Local Generalization)

Smoothness Prior

For a small enough radius $\epsilon \geq 0$ in the vicinity of a given training input x, an $x + r$ satisfying $||r|| \leq \epsilon$ will get assigned a high probability of the correct class by the model.

- This kind of smoothness prior is typically valid for computer vision problems.
- In general, imperceptibly tiny perturbations of a given image do not normally change the underlying class.

The main result of the paper is that **for deep neural networks, the smoothness assumption does not hold**.

Blind Spots

- In some sense, what we describe is a way to **traverse the manifold** represented by the network in an efficient way (by optimization) and finding **adversarial examples** in the input space.
- The adversarial examples represent **low-probability (high-dimensional) “pockets” in the manifold,** which are hard to efficiently find by simply randomly sampling the input around a given example.

Formal description

For a given $x \in \mathbb{R}^m$ image and target label $l \in \{1...k\}$, we aim to solve the following box-constrained optimization problem:

$$\text{Minimize } \|r\|_2 \text{ subject to:}$$
$$f(x+r) = l$$
$$x + r \in [0,1]^m$$

- Informally, $x' = x + r$ is the closest image to x classified as l by f.

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- The minimizer r might not be unique.
- This task is non-trivial only if $f(x) \neq l$.
- In general, the exact computation of x' is a hard problem, so we approximate it by using a box-constrained L-BFGS.

Formal description

Recall: Generalized Lagrange Function (Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT))

Suppose we wish to maximize $f(x)$ subject to $g_j(x) = 0$ for $j = 1, \cdots, J$, and $h_k(x) \geq 0$ for $k = 1, \cdots, K$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Minimize} \quad & f(x) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & g_j(x) = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad j = 1, \cdots, J \\ & h_k(x) \geq 0 \quad \text{for} \quad k = 1, \cdots, K \end{aligned}$$

We introduce Lagrange multipliers $\{\lambda_j\}$ and $\{\mu_k\}$, and then optimize the Lagrangian function given by

$$L(x, \{\lambda_j\}, \{\mu_k\}) = f(x) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \lambda_j g_j(x) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mu_k h_k(x)$$

subject to $\mu_k \geq 0$ and $\mu_k h_k(x) = 0$ for $k = 1, \cdots, K$.

The optimal point $x^\star$ of the above constrained optimization on $f(x)$ is the same as the optimal point of the unconstrained optimization L.

(See this playlist for more information about Lagrange multipliers)

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Concretely, we find an approximation of x' by performing line-search to find the minimum $c > 0$ for which the minimizer r of the following problem satisfies $f(x+r) = l$.

$$\text{Minimize } c\|r\|_2 + loss_f(x+r, l) \text{ subject to } x + r \in [0,1]^m$$

- Since neural networks are non-convex in general, so we end up with an approximation to find solution.

Adversarial Examples

(a) (b)

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Adversarial Examples



(*Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models*, Zou, 2021)

Experimental results

Intriguing properties

- **100%** success rate
  - For all the networks we studied (MNIST, AlexNet (ImageNet)), for each sample, we have always managed to generate very close, visually hard to distinguish, adversarial examples that are misclassified by the original network.

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The above observations suggest that adversarial examples are somewhat **universal** and not just the results of overfitting to a particular model or to the specific selection of the training set.

Spectral Analysis of Unstability

- The adversarial examples show that there exist **small additive perturbations** of the input (in Euclidean sense) that produce **large perturbations at the output** of the last layer.
- Mathematically, if $\phi(x)$ denotes the output of a network of K layers corresponding to input x and trained parameters W, we write

$$\phi(x) = \phi_K(\phi_{K-1}(...\phi_1(x; W_1)...; W_{K-1})W_K)$$

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- The unstability of $\phi(x)$ can be explained by inspecting the upper **Lipschitz constant** of each layer.

Lipschitz continuity

A function $f : I \rightarrow R$ over some set $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ is called Lipschitz continuous if there exists a positive real constant L such that, for all $x, y \in I$,

$$|f(y) - f(x)| \leq L\|y - x\|_2$$

or

$$f(x) - L\|y - x\|_2 \leq f(y) \leq f(x) + L\|y - x\|_2$$

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Generally, Let $f = f_1 \circ f_2 \circ .... \circ f_K$ and the Lipschitz constant of f_i be L_i for all $i \in \{1, 2, ..., K\}$, then the Lipschitz constant of f is $L \leq \prod_{k=1}^{K} L_k$.

Lipschitz continuity



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

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$$\phi(x) = \phi_K(\phi_{K-1}(...\phi_1(x; W_1)...; W_{K-1})W_K)$$

  where ϕ_K denotes the operator mapping layer $k-1$ to layer k.
- The unstability of $\phi(x)$ can be explained by inspecting the *upper Lipschitz constant* of each layer, defined as the constant $L_k > 0$ such that

$$\forall x, r, \;\; \|\phi_k(x; W_k) - \phi_k(x + r; W_k)\| \leq L_k \|r\|$$

- The resulting network thus satsifies $\|\phi(x + r) - \phi(x)\| \leq L\|r\|$, with $L \leq \prod_{k=1}^{K} L_k$.

Lipschitz continuity

Let $f : I \rightarrow R$ be a continuous and differntiable function over some set $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$, if we have $\|f'(x)\|_2 \leq m$ for all $x \in I$, then m is the upper Lipschitz constant of f ($L \leq m$).

Lipschitz continuity

Let $f : I \to R$ be a continuous and differntiable function over some set $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$, if we have $\|f'(x)\|_2 \leq m$ for all $x \in I$, then m is the upper Lipschitz constant of f ($L \leq m$).

Proof sketch:
Mean value theorem: Let $f : I \to R$ be a continuous and differntiable function over some set $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$, For all $a, b \in I$ $(b > a)$, there exists some $c \in (a, b)$ such that:

$$f'(c) = \frac{f(b) - f(a)}{b - a}$$

For all $a, b \in I$, there exist $c \in (a, b)$, such that:

$$|f(b) - f(a)| = \|f'(c).b - a\|_2 \leq \|f'(c)\|_2 \|b - a\|_2.$$

Since we know that $\|f'(c)\|_2 \leq m$, we have

$$|f(b) - f(a)| \leq m\|b - a\|_2.$$



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- Linear layers (Wx) have the Lipschitz constant of $\sigma(W)$, where σ is the spectral norm (largest singular value).
  - Lipschits constant of linear layers

$$\|Wy - Wx\|_2 \leq L\|y-x\|_2 \Rightarrow \|W(y-x)\|_2 \leq L\|y-x\|_2$$

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  - The spectral norm of a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times n}$ is defined as

$$\sigma(A) = \max_{x\in\mathbb{R}^n, x\neq 0} \frac{\|Ax\|_2}{\|x\|_2}$$

  which corresponds to the largest singular value of A

Spectral norm definition source.

Spectral Analysis of Unstability

Layer	Size	Stride	Upper bound
Conv. 1	$3 \times 11 \times 11 \times 96$	4	2.75
Conv. 2	$96 \times 5 \times 5 \times 256$	1	10
Conv. 3	$256 \times 3 \times 3 \times 384$	1	7
Conv. 4	$384 \times 3 \times 3 \times 384$	1	7.5
Conv. 5	$384 \times 3 \times 3 \times 256$	1	11
FC. 1	9216×4096	N/A	3.12
FC. 2	4096×4096	N/A	4
FC. 3	4096×1000	N/A	4

Table 5: Frame Bounds of each rectified layer of the network from [9].

$$2.75 \times 10 \times 7 \times 7.5 \times 11 \times 3.12 \times 4 \times 4 \approx 793000$$

- Notice that we compute upper bounds: large bounds do not automatically translate into existence of adversarial examples; however, small bounds guarantee that no such examples can appear.

Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples

Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples

Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2015

EXPLAINING AND HARNESSING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES

Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy
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Abstract

- We argue the primary cause of neural networks' vulnerability to adversarial perturbation is their **linear nature**.
- Giving the first explanation of the most intriguing fact about them: their **generalization** across architectures and training sets.
- We propose a **simple and fast method of generating adversarial examples**. Using this approach to provide examples for **adversarial training**.

Smoothness Prior with L_∞

- For problems with well-separated classes, we expect the classifier to assign the same class to x and $x' = x + \eta$ so long as $\|\eta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$, where ϵ is small.
  - For $\mathbf{x} = [x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_d]^T$, $\|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty = \max_i |x_i|$.

The Linear Explanation of Adversarial Examples

- Let $\hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}' = \boldsymbol{x} + \eta$, the dot product between weight vector $\boldsymbol{w}$ and adversarial example x' is as follows

$$\hat{y}' = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x}' = \boldsymbol{w}^T(\boldsymbol{x} + \eta) = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta \Rightarrow \hat{y}' - \hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta$$

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  The adversarial perturbation causes the activation to grow by $\boldsymbol{w}^T \eta$.

- To generate adversarial example for x, we should maximize $\boldsymbol{w}^T \eta$, such that $\|\eta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$. Therefore, we have the following maximization problem.

$$\underset{\eta}{\text{argmax}} < \boldsymbol{w}, \eta >$$
$$s.t. \quad \|\eta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$$

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$$\begin{aligned} &\underset{\eta}{\text{argmax}} < \boldsymbol{w}, \eta > \\ &s.t. \quad \|\eta\|_\infty \le \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

  The solution to the above problem is $\eta^* = \epsilon.\text{sign}(\boldsymbol{w})$, we have

$$\hat{y}' - \hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta^* = \boldsymbol{w}^T\epsilon.\text{sign}(\boldsymbol{w}) = \epsilon\|\boldsymbol{w}\|_1$$

The Linear Explanation of Adversarial Examples

- Let $\hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{x}' = \boldsymbol{x} + \eta$, the dot product between weight vector $\boldsymbol{w}$ and adversarial example x' is as follows

$$\hat{y}' = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x}' = \boldsymbol{w}^T(\boldsymbol{x} + \eta) = \boldsymbol{w}^T\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta \Rightarrow \hat{y}' - \hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta$$

  The adversarial perturbation causes the activation to grow by $\boldsymbol{w}^T\eta$.

- To generate adversarial example for x, we should maximize $\boldsymbol{w}^T\eta$, such that $\|\eta\|_\infty \le \epsilon$. Therefore, we have the following maximization problem.

$$\underset{\eta}{\text{argmax}} < \boldsymbol{w}, \eta >$$
$$s.t. \quad \|\eta\|_\infty \le \epsilon$$

  The solution to the above problem is $\eta^* = \epsilon.\text{sign}(\boldsymbol{w})$, we have

$$\hat{y}' - \hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^T\eta^* = \boldsymbol{w}^T\epsilon.\text{sign}(\boldsymbol{w}) = \epsilon\|\boldsymbol{w}\|_1$$

- If $\boldsymbol{w}$ has n dimensions and the average magnitude of an element of the weight vector is m, then the **activation will grow by** ϵmn**.** Thereby, as the dimension of the input increases, the value of $\hat{y}' - \hat{y}$ will grow.
- This explanation shows that a simple **linear model can have adversarial examples** if its input has **sufficient dimensionality**.

Linear Perturbation for Non-linear Models

The **linear view** of adversarial examples suggests a **fast** way of generating them.

- It is hypothesized that deep nets are **too linear** to resist adversarial perturbations (ReLU activation function).
- More nonlinear models such as **sigmoid or tanh** networks are carefully tuned to spend most of their time in the **non-saturating, more linear regime**.

Hence, we suppose Deep nets have **linear behavior** in the **vicinity** of each data point.

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Recall: Taylor Series (Expansion)

Suppose n is a positive integer and $f : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is n times differentiable at a point x_0. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
f(x) &= \sum_{k=0}^{n} \frac{f^{(k)}(x_0)}{k!}(x - x_0)^k + R_n(x, x_0) \\
&= f(x_0) + f'(x_0)(x - x_0) + \frac{f''(x_0)}{2}(x - x_0)^2 + \dots
\end{aligned}
$$

where the remainder R_n satisfies

$$R_n(x, x_0) = o(|x - x_0|^n) \text{ as } x \to x_0.$$

Definition: A sequence of numbers X_n is said to be $o(r_n)$ if $\frac{X_n}{r_n} \to 0$ as $n \to \infty$.

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Consequently, we can linearly approximate classifier $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}$ around data point x_0 by **Taylor expansion**. We have:

$$f(x) = f(x_0) + (x - x_0)^T \nabla_x f(x)$$

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$$f(x') = f(x + \eta) = f(x_0) + (\eta)^T \nabla_x f(x) \Rightarrow f(x') - f(x_0) = (\eta)^T \nabla_x f(x)$$

To maximize difference between $f(x)$ and $f(x')$, we should maximize $< \eta^T, \nabla_x f(x) >$. Given $\|\eta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$, we have

$$\eta = \epsilon.sign(\nabla_x f(x))$$

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$$\eta = \epsilon.sign(\nabla_x f(x))$$

We can replace classifier output with cost function J

$$\eta = \epsilon.sign(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$$

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)

Let $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ be the parameters of a model, $\boldsymbol{x}$ the input to the model, y the label associated with $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y)$ be the cost used to train the neural network.

We can linearize the cost function around the current value of $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, obtaining an optimal max-norm constrained perturbation of

$$\boldsymbol{\eta} = \epsilon\, sign(\nabla_x J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, y))$$

We refer to this as the "**fast gradient sign method**" of generating adversarial examples.



Figure 1: A demonstration of fast adversarial example generation applied to GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al., 2014a) on ImageNet. By adding an imperceptibly small vector whose elements are equal to the sign of the elements of the gradient of the cost function with respect to the input, we can change GoogLeNet's classification of the image. Here our ϵ of .007 corresponds to the magnitude of the smallest bit of an 8 bit image encoding after GoogLeNet's conversion to real numbers.

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Transfer-based

- Create a surrogate model with high **fidelity** to the taget model.
- Generate adversarial examples on the surrogate model using **white-box** attacks.
- Then, **transfer** pregenerated adversarial examples to the target model.

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Query-based

- Based on the target model responses for consecutive queries
  - Gradient estimation
    - Based on zero-order (ZO) optimization algorithms
  - Search-based
    - Based on choosing a search strategy using a search distribution.

Potemkin village - Clever Hans

- These results suggest that classifiers based on modern machine learning techniques, even those that obtain excellent performance on the test set, are not learning the true underlying concepts that determine the correct output label.
- Instead, these algorithms have built a **Potemkin village that works well on naturally occuring data, but is exposed as a fake when one visits points in space that do not have high probability in the data distribution.**
- Clever Hans was a horse that was claimed to have performed arithmetic and other intellectual tasks. After a formal investigation in 1907, psychologist Oskar Pfungst demonstrated that the horse was not actually performing these mental tasks, but was watching the reactions of his trainer.



Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial

Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial

Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks

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Abstract

- We study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of **robust optimization**
- We use a natural **saddle point (min-max) formulation** to capture the notion of security against adversarial attacks.
- We explore the impact of network architecture on adversarial robustness and find that **model capacity plays an important role** here.

An Optimization View on Adversarial Robustness

Empirical risk minimization (ERM) has been tremendously successful as a recipe for finding classifiers with small population risk.

- The goal of standard training is to find model parameters θ that minimize the risk func. L

$$\underset{\theta}{min}\ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[L(x,y,\theta)]$$

where data distribution $\mathcal{D}$ is over pairs of examples $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and corresponding labels $y \in [K]$ (K is the number of classes).

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In order to reliably train models that are robust to adversarial attacks, it is necessary to **augment the ERM paradigm** appropriately by changing the definition of population risk $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[L]$

- Instead of feeding samples from the distribution $\mathcal{D}$ directly into the loss L, we allow the adversary to **perturb the input first**. This gives rise to the following saddle point problem

$$\underset{\theta}{min}\ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}}\left[\underset{\delta\in\mathcal{S}}{max}\ L(\theta, x+\delta, y)\right]$$

  where $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ is allowed perturbations that formalizes the manipulative power of the adversary (e.g., L_∞-ball).

Adversarial Loss

$$\underset{\theta}{min}\ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{D}}\left[\underset{\delta\in\mathcal{S}}{max}\ L(\theta, x+\delta, y)\right]$$

Our perspective stems from viewing the **saddle point** problem as the composition of an **inner maximization** problem and an **outer minimization** problem.



Source

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- The **inner maximization** problem aims to **find an adversarial version of a given data** point x that achieves a high loss.



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

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- The goal of the **outer minimization** problem is to **find model parameters** so that the **adversarial loss** given by the inner attack problem is **minimized**.
- When the parameters θ yield a (nearly) **vanishing risk**, the corresponding model is perfectly **robust to attacks** specified by our attack model.



Source

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attack - L_∞

FGSM is a simple one-step scheme for maximizing the inner part of the saddle point formulation. A more powerful adversary is the **multi-step variant**, which is essentially projected gradient descent (PGD) on the negative loss function

$$
\begin{aligned}
x^0 &= Clip_{[0,1]}\{x + U(-\epsilon, \epsilon)\}, \\
\delta^{t+1} &= \alpha.sign(\nabla_x L(\theta, x^t, y)), \\
x^{t+1} &= Clip_{[max(0,x-\epsilon),min(1,x+\epsilon)]}\{x^t + \delta^{t+1}\}.
\end{aligned}
$$

where x is a natural data, U is uniform distribution, $Clip_{[a,b]}\{x\}$ function is used to trim values outside interval $[a, b]$ to the interval edges, ϵ is the radius of allowed perturbation $\|.\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$, and t is iteration index.



Source

PGD-L_∞ Source Code

```python
def perturb(self, x_nat, y, sess):
  """Given a set of examples (x_nat, y), returns a set of adversarial
     examples within epsilon of x_nat in l_infinity norm."""
  if self.rand:
    x = x_nat + np.random.uniform(-self.epsilon, self.epsilon, x_nat.shape)
    x = np.clip(x, 0, 1) # ensure valid pixel range
  else:
    x = np.copy(x_nat)

  for i in range(self.k):
    grad = sess.run(self.grad, feed_dict={self.model.x_input: x,
                                          self.model.y_input: y})

    x += self.a * np.sign(grad)

    x = np.clip(x, x_nat - self.epsilon, x_nat + self.epsilon)
    x = np.clip(x, 0, 1) # ensure valid pixel range

  return x
```

Source

The Landscape of Adversarial Examples

While there are many local maxima spread widely apart within $x_i + \mathcal{S}$, they tend to have **very well-concentrated loss values**.

- This echoes the folklore belief that training neural networks is possible because the loss (as a function of model parameters) typically has many local minima with very similar values.



(a) MNIST Standard training (b) MNIST Adversarial training (c) CIFAR10 Natural training (d) CIFAR10 Adversarial training

Figure 1: Cross-entropy loss values while creating an adversarial example from the MNIST and CIFAR10 evaluation datasets. The plots show how the loss evolves during 20 runs of projected gradient descent (PGD). Each run starts at a uniformly random point in the ℓ_∞-ball around the same natural example (additional plots for different examples appear in Figure 11). The adversarial loss plateaus after a small number of iterations. The optimization trajectories and final loss values are also fairly clustered, especially on CIFAR10. Moreover, the final loss values on adversarially trained networks are significantly smaller than on their standard counterparts.

First-Order Adversaries

The concentration phenomenon suggests an **intriguing view** on the problem in which robustness against the PGD adversary yields robustness against all **first-order adversaries**

- As long as the adversary only uses gradients of the loss function with respect to the input, **we conjecture** that it **will not find significantly better local maxima than PGD**.
- Of course, our exploration with PGD does not preclude the existence of **some isolated maxima** with much larger function value.
- However, our experiments suggest that such better local maxima are **hard to find** with first order methods.

Network Capacity and Adversarial Robustness

Classifying examples in a robust way requires a stronger classifier, since the presence of **adversarial examples changes the decision boundary of the problem to a more complicated one**.

- Our experiments verify that capacity is crucial for robustness, as well as for the ability to successfully train against strong adversaries.



Figure 3: A conceptual illustration of standard vs. adversarial decision boundaries. Left: A set of points that can be easily separated with a simple (in this case, linear) decision boundary. Middle: The simple decision boundary does not separate the ℓ_∞-balls (here, squares) around the data points. Hence there are adversarial examples (the red stars) that will be misclassified. Right: Separating the ℓ_∞-balls requires a significantly more complicated decision boundary. The resulting classifier is robust to adversarial examples with bounded ℓ_∞-norm perturbations.

Network Capacity and Adversarial Robustness

Either **increasing the capacity** of the network, or using a **stronger method for the inner optimization** problem reduces the effectiveness of adversarial inputs (in other words, **increase the robustness of model**).

MNIST



CIFAR10

	Simple	Wide
Natural	92.7%	95.2%
FGSM	27.5%	32.7%
PGD	0.8%	3.5%

(a) Standard training

Simple	Wide
87.4%	90.3%
90.9%	95.1%
0.0%	0.0%

(b) FGSM training

Simple	Wide
79.4%	87.3%
51.7%	56.1%
43.7%	45.8%

(c) PGD training

Simple	Wide
0.00357	0.00371
0.0115	0.00557
1.11	0.0218

(d) Training Loss

Figure 4: The effect of network capacity on the performance of the network. We trained MNIST and CIFAR10 networks of varying capacity on: (a) natural examples, (b) with FGSM-made adversarial examples, (c) with PGD-made adversarial examples. In the first three plots/tables of each dataset, we show how the standard and adversarial accuracy changes with respect to capacity for each training regime. In the final plot/table, we show the value of the cross-entropy loss on the adversarial examples the networks were trained on. This corresponds to the value of our saddle point formulation (2.1) for different sets of allowed perturbations.

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

CIFAR10

	(a) Standard training: Simple	(a) Standard training: Wide	(b) FGSM training: Simple	(b) FGSM training: Wide	(c) PGD training: Simple	(c) PGD training: Wide	(d) Training Loss: Simple	(d) Training Loss: Wide
Natural	92.7%	95.2%	87.4%	90.3%	79.4%	87.3%	0.00357	0.00371
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(a) Standard training (b) FGSM training (c) PGD training (d) Training Loss

References

- C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, et al., ”Intriguing properties of neural networks,” in 2nd International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2014, Banff, AB, Canada, April 14-16, 2014.
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